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COMMENTS
THE SPAM SHAM OF WHITE BUFFALO
VENTURES: A PROPOSAL FOR CITIES AND
MUNICIPALITIES TO REGULATE SPAM ON A
PUBLIC NETWORK
Michael Bailey+
In 2004, President Bush announced a policy goal of bringing affordable,
broadband technology "to every corner of [the] country by the year
2007."' Nearly three years later, the United States is still short of this
goal of universal broadband coverage Increasingly, cities and munici-
palities are helping to bridge this gap by providing free or low-cost
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law. The author wishes to thank his friends and family for their love and support, Pro-
fessor Irwin for his expertise, and most importantly, Liz, for reminding him that there is
much more to life than spam, bluesheets, and Law Review.
1. Remarks to the American Association of Community Colleges Convention in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 695 (Apr. 26,2004).
2. See JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOME
BROADBAND ADOPTION 2006, at i (2006), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/
PIP Broadband_0506.pdf (noting that as of March 2006, 42% of all adults subscribed to
high-speed Internet services). Consumer advocates argue that high prices have impeded
the growth of broadband, while the Baby Bells and cable companies counter that universal
broadband is economically unwise in today's regulatory environment. Compare MARK
COOPER, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., EXPANDING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE & FALLING
BEHIND ON BROADBAND: WHY A TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY OF NEGLECT Is NOT
BENIGN 1 (2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/digitaldivide.pdf (arguing
that the Baby Bells and cable TV companies, as the two providers of broadband, share a
duopoly that keeps broadband prices high), with Steven Titch, Market Failure in Broad-
band?, IT&T NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005, available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?
artld=17746 (noting that the United States ranks low in per capita broadband penetration
because the nation is large and less densely populated, resulting in high costs in building
and maintaining a nationwide system of fiber optic lines). Whoever is to blame, the
United States continues to fall behind other developed countries in providing universal
broadband access. See WebSiteOptimization.com, US Drops to 20th in Broadband Pene-
tration, http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0607/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (noting
that the United States fell from seventeenth to twentieth in broadband penetration world
rankings in 2006).
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broadband services to local businesses and residents.3 Provo, Utah has
owned and operated a fiber optic network for over nine years.4 Likewise,
Anaheim, California recently unveiled a wireless network that will even-
tually cover the entire city.' Other major cities that will soon provide
broadband services to city residents include Philadelphia,6 Tempe,7 and
New Orleans.8
As cities that provide free or low-cost broadband (public ISPs) flour-
ish,9 they will search for ways to promote efficiency and productivity on
their networks. 10 In so doing, public ISPs will inevitably come face to face
3. See HAROLD FELD, ET AL., CONNECTING THE PUBLIC: THE TRUTH ABOUT
MUNICIPAL BROADBAND 1 (2005), available at http://www.mediaaccess.org/Municipal
BroadbandWhitePaper.pdf (explaining how hundreds of local governments have recently
explored ways to provide free municipal networks); Megan Barnett, Tech Trends: In Some
Towns, Cheaper Online Access, U.S.NEWS.COM, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.usnews.com/
usnewslbiztech/articles/050802/2techtrends.htm (describing activities in small towns across
America to provide free or low-cost public Internet); see also infra notes 4-8 and accompa-
nying text. Public officials have increasingly adopted a mindset that they can play a role in
advancing universal broadband access. See, e.g., How Internet Protocol-Enabled Services
Are Changing the Face of Communications: A View from Government Officials: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 109th Cong. 48-49 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Protocol-Enabled Services
Hearing] (statement of David C. Quam, Director, Federal Relations, National Governors
Association) (arguing that states should help advance the goal of universal broadband).
This has led to a wave of cities building or contracting to build public networks.
4. See Internet Protocol-Enabled Services Hearing, supra note 3, at 5-6 (statement of
Hon. Lewis K. Billings, Mayor, Provo City, Utah) (describing the efforts at Provo Utah to
build a city-wide fiber optic network to benefit schools, businesses, and the community).
5. Matt Richtel, A World Beyond Dial-Up: EarthLink Hurls Itself Into a Heady New
Telecom Universe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,2006, at Cl.
6. See Sewell Chan, New York Plans to Examine Creating a Broadband Net, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2006, at B2. The rates in Philadelphia will be as low as $10 per month.
Michael Hinkelman, Earthlink Exec Is Sky-High on Philly, PHIL. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 5,
2005, at 5.
7. See Chan, supra note 6.
8. See Richtel, supra note 5, at C2.
9. See FELD ET AL., supra note 3, at 4 (noting that hundreds of cities have explored
municipal broadband in 2004 and 2005 alone). The fact that municipal broadband is flour-
ishing does not necessarily mean that public Internet is a good idea. See NEW
MILLENNIUM RESEARCH COUNCIL, NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST-THE MYTH OF
MUNICIPAL WI-FI NETWORKS, at iv (2005), available at http://www.newmillennium
research.org/archive/wifireport2305.pdf (arguing that "beneath the positive media cover-
age and glowing press announcements [of municipal broadband] are troubling signs that
these publicly held networks can result in less than anticipated outcomes"). Currently,
advocates and opponents of public Internet are battling in state and federal legislatures
over the future of municipal broadband. See FELD ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. This topic,
although critical to the future of public ISPs, requires a detailed analysis and is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
10. See FELD ET AL., supra note 3, at 8-9 (noting that public ISPs are attractive to
customers and businesses because they offer free, efficient Internet service); see also
JOSEPH L. BAST, MUNICIPALLY OWNED BROADBAND NETWORKS: A CRITICAL
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with spam. Spam'1 continues to clog the arteries of e-mail traffic on the
Internet 2 and imposes significant costs on businesses that rely on the
Internet for e-business and communications." What better way for a
public ISP to encourage the use of public Internet than by prohibiting
spam on its network?
4
The ability of a public ISP to do this may be limited by the Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM)
Act of 2003,5 the federal law that preempts the ability of a state to regu-
late nonfraudulent and nonmisleading spam (legitimate spam). 6 How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit's 2005 decision in White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v.
EVALUATION 5-6 (2004), available at http://www.heartland.org/pdf/15842.pdf (noting that
public ISP proponents argue that free broadband spurs economic development and effi-
cient Internet service).
11. The Federal Trade Commission formally defines spain as unsolicited commercial
e-mail. 149 CONG. REC. S13,020 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. McCain).
However, some people think that spam is any "unwanted" e-mail that a consumer receives.
Reduction in Distribution of Spam Act of 2003: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2003)
[hereinafter House Judiciary Spam Hearings] (statement of Jerry Kilgore, Att'y Gen. of
Virginia). For purposes of this Comment, "spam" refers to the narrower class of commer-
cial e-mail: unsolicited commercial e-mail communications.
12. See Tom Zeller Jr., The Fight Against Vl@gra (and Other Spam), N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2006, § 3, at 1 (noting that 70% of all e-mail messages circulating on the internet
are spam). The amount of spam on the Internet has remained consistent over the past few
years. See Tom Zeller Jr., Even in Vain, Swatting Spammers Feels Good, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
15, 2005, at C3 (noting that the amount of spam filtered by Postini in 2005 stayed the same
as the previous year at 75%, while the amount for MessageLabs dropped from 83% to
67%).
13. See Gregg Keizer, Data Worries Stunt E-commerce, Online Banking, TECHWEB,
June 23, 2005, http://www.techweb.com/wire/ebiz/164902296 (stating that spain could slow
the development of e-commerce by as much as 3%). Although spain continues to prolifer-
ate, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, filters and user acceptance of spain have
helped alleviate the spam crisis. See Logan G. Harbaugh, Next-Gen Appliances Put
Spammers in the Crosshairs, INFOWORLD, Aug. 29, 2005, at 23, 23 (reporting that current
filtering technology is so advanced that it can now eliminate 95% of all incoming sparn);
see also Memorandum from Deborah Fallows, Senior Research Fellow, Pew Internet &
Am. Life Project 1 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.pewlnternet.org/pdfs/
PIPSPAMApO5.pdf (concluding that e-mail users are less annoyed with spain today than
they were one year ago). Still, the spam that does trickle through filters continues to en-
gender consumer distrust of e-mail, see id. at 2, an important factor that could slow the
development of e-commerce, see Keizer, supra.
14. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7712 (Supp. 1II 2003).
16. See infra Part I.B. Commentators on the CAN-SPAM Act have argued that the
Act supersedes state laws restricting legitimate spam, but does not preempt state regula-
tions dealing with fraudulent or misleading spam. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sullivan & Michael
de Leeuw, Spain After CAN-SPAM: How Inconsistent Thinking Has Made a Hash Out of
Unsolicited Commercial E-mail Policy, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
887, 895-97 (2004); Roger Allan Ford, Comment, Preemption of State Spain Laws by the
Federal CAN-SPAM Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 375 (2005).
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University of Texas at Austin 7 opens the door for such state regulations."
The Fifth Circuit held that the University of Texas at Austin, a public
university, could prohibit spam on its server without being preempted by
the CAN-SPAM Act.' 9 This holding arguably supports a public ISP seek-
ing to prohibit spam on its network.0
A public ISP interested in regulating spam thus faces two choices in the
wake of White Buffalo Ventures: (1) ban all spam on its network under
the Fifth Circuit's holding, or (2) comply with the CAN-SPAM Act.2
Public ISPs cannot wait, however, for this judicial uncertainty to clear;
they need to craft regulations today that will withstand tomorrow's legal
challenges.2 This Comment offers a legal approach to meet this need so
that public ISPs can implement spain policies today that will ensure effi-
cient public servers well into the future. 3
This Comment begins with an overview of legal principles relevant to a
public ISP regulating spam on its network. Next, this Comment describes
the CAN-SPAM Act and the Fifth Circuit's decision in White Buffalo
Ventures interpreting the scope of the CAN-SPAM Act's exemption and
preemption provisions. This Comment then moves to a critical analysis
of the White Buffalo Ventures decision. Finally, this Comment proposes a
course of action for a public ISP seeking to formulate a viable spam pol-
icy in light of White Buffalo Ventures. This Comment proposes that a
public ISP should adopt a hands-off approach that allows e-mail provid-
ers and filtering companies to continue to do what they do best: develop
technology that stops spam from reaching e-mail accounts.
17. 420 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
18. See generally infra Part II (discussing the effect of White Buffalo Ventures on the
preemption of state spam-blocking laws).
19. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372-74.
20. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. Although some legal commentary has approved the Fifth Circuit's preemption
holding, see, e.g., Posting of Ethan Ackerman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
http:/Iblog.ericgoldman.org/archives/spam/ (Aug. 29, 2005, 22:00 EST); Posting of Lauren
Gilman to Blogs at the Center for Internet and Society, http://cyberlaw.stanford.
edu/blogs/gelman/archives/003227.shtml (Aug. 10, 2005, 10:29 EST), a closer inspection of
the CAN-SPAM Act casts doubt on whether or not the court's approach will withstand
future preemption challenges. See infra Part III.A. Since White Buffalo Ventures is the
first litigation dealing with the preemptive effect of the CAN-SPAM Act, see White Buf-
falo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 371, future preemption suits will almost certainly arise.
23. See infra Part III.
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I. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR SPAM REGULATIONS ON A PUBLIC
NETWORK: THE CONSTITUTION, THE CAN-SPAM ACT, AND THE WHITE
BUFFALO VENTURES DECISION
A. Constitutional Principles Relevant to Spam Regulations
1. Preemption Law
Preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which mandates that federal laws made pursuant to
the Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."24 There is
some debate regarding whether preemption is a grant of power to Con-
gress under the Constitution or a scheme of regulation under the Su-
premacy Clause.5 Regardless of its origin, the practical effect of preemp-
tion is that when a state law conflicts with a federal law that is enacted
pursuant to a constitutional grant of power, the state law is preempted.26
Over time, courts have defined three categories of preemption: express
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. Express pre
emption occurs when Congress expressly defines the extent to which a
federal law preempts state legislation.2 Field preemption occurs when,
on the face of a law, the "scheme of federal regulation . . . [is] so perva-
sive" that it can be inferred that Congress intended to occupy the field.29
Even if Congress does not intend to occupy a field, conflict preemption
may still occur if state and federal law naturally conflict with each other. °
Although preemption law has been criticized as lacking predictability
or consistency,31 there are several principles that can be gleaned from
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ).
25. See Viet D. Dinh, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability: Reas-
sessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2088-91 (2000). The Supreme Court has
made sweeping statements that Congress has the power under the Constitution to preempt
state law. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). How-
ever, constitutional law experts have criticized this generalization because Congress only
has power to act within its enumerated powers, and preemption is not one of them. See,
e.g., Dinh, supra, at 2088. A more accurate characterization of preemption is that it is not
a power of Congress, but a natural result that flows from the Supremacy Clause when an
act of Congress conflicts with a state law. See id.
26. CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94-95 (2004).
27. See id. at 95-96.
28. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,78 (1990).
29. Id. at 79 (omission in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218,230 (1947)).
30. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372.
31. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975) ("The Supreme
Court... has not developed a uniform approach to preemption; its decisions in this area..
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preemption jurisprudence. 2 First, federal law should not preempt state
law unless preemption is "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.,
3
Congressional intent should be determined through an incremental proc-
ess.34 The court should initially analyze the plain text of the statutory
language.35 If the plain meaning is not clear, the court can infer congres-
sional intent by referring to the statute's structure36 and to legislative his-
tory.37 The legal community is divided, however, on the extent to which
legislative history should be used to infer congressional intent; 38 Some
jurists endorse a sweeping review of legislative history,39 while others ad-
. [are] seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis."); Dinh, supra note 25, at 2085
("[T]he Supreme Court's numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential
or analytical pattern.").
32. See infra notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
33. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("[T]he purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
34. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 895 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the plain wording" of a clause "necessarily contains the best evi-
dence of Congress' pre-emptive intent" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36. See id. at 870-71 (majority opinion) (comparing a preemption provision and a
saving provision to determine Congress' intent in the scope of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 545 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("The ultimate question in each case ... is one of Con-
gress's intent, as revealed by the text, structure, purposes, and subject matter of the statutes
involved." (emphasis added)).
37. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 (1991); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 79 (1941) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that congressional intent is not only found by looking at the statute
but also by analyzing the statute "in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative
history").
38. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. See generally Alex Kozinski, Should
Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807
(1998) (describing the modern debate concerning the constitutionality of using legislative
history to find congressional intent).
39. See, e.g., Mortier, 501 U.S. at 610 n.4. Justice White, writing for the majority in
Mortier, offered a ringing endorsement for using all available legislative materials to de-
termine congressional intent:
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that
inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it. As
Chief Justice Marshall put it, "[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the
legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived." Legislative history
materials are not generally so misleading that jurists should never employ them in a
good-faith effort to discern legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the
Court's practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past. We suspect
that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.
Id. at 611-12 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
358, 386 (1805)) (citation omitted). But see id. at 622 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
Chief Justice Marshall would never support reaching into legislative history to determine
congressional intent).
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vocate for limited use due to its unreliability and tendency to be manipu-
lated. '
The Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League4'
demonstrates how this principle of statutory construction is applied to a
preemption provision in a telecommunications law.42 In Nixon, a group
of Missouri municipalities challenged a Missouri law that prohibited state
subdivisions from providing telecommunications services. 4  The munici-
palities claimed that section 253 of the Telecommunications Act, which
bans states from "prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide... tele-
communications service[s],"" preempted the Missouri law.45 The Court,
in interpreting whether Congress intended for "any entity" to include
state subdivisions, rejected a strict textual approach.46 Instead, the Court
looked to policy considerations, the structure of the statute, and legisla-
tive history to determine congressional intent. 47 The Court concluded
that Congress did not intend for state subdivisions to fall under section
253, and declined to preempt the Missouri law in light of the presumption
against preemption.4
A second principle governing preemption analysis is that courts recog-
nize a "presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regula-
tions." 49 This presumption only applies when Congress legislates "[i]n
areas which the States have traditionally occupied" and not in a field
where Congress has traditionally regulated.0 Although federal law often
intrudes upon state police powers," the Court has refused to apply the
presumption when a regulatory scheme fits squarely within federal pow-
40. See generally id. at 617-23 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the difficulty of cull-
ing congressional intent from committee reports and floor statements). Justice Scalia
pointed out in Mortier that using legislative history in statutory construction is a relatively
new phenomenon that Justice Jackson once described as a "'weird endeavor."' Id. at 622
(quoting United States v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)).
41. 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
42. Id. at 129.
43. Id.
44. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000).
45. Nixon, 541 U.S. at 129.
46. See id. at 132-33 ("The Eighth Circuit trained its analysis on the words 'any entity,'
left undefined by the statute, with much weight being placed on the modifier 'any.' But
concentration on the writing on the page does not produce a persuasive answer here.").
47. See id. at 131-41.
48. Id. at 140-41.
49. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992); see also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
50. DRAHOZAL, supra note 26, at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 113.
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ers 2 Even if the presumption is raised, it can be overcome if Congress
has clearly manifested a purpose of preempting the state law.53
White Buffalo Ventures is the first case involving the scope of the CAN-
SPAM Act's preemption provision, leaving this issue as an open question
of law. 4 There is a line of dormant commerce clause decisions, however,
that have considered whether spain regulations are an appropriate effec-
tuation of state police powers. 5' These decisions established that state-
level spam regulations constitute a legitimate use of the state police
power 6.5  The logical inference of this is that state-level spam regulations,
as legitimate uses of state police power, are sufficient to trigger the pre-
sumption against preemption when federal law is in conflict. 7
2. Commercial Speech Law
In addition to preemption, commercial speech law is relevant to a pub-
lic ISP regulating spam on its server. The First Amendment provides that
states cannot legislate in such a manner that restricts freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court first recognized commercial speech as a constitution-
ally protected form of speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council'9 The Supreme Court recognized three
interests underlying this protection: (1) the right of a speaker to advertise
52. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (holding that the pre-
sumption against preemption is not triggered when maritime trade regulations are in-
volved); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (reaffirming
that policing fraud against federal agencies is an exclusive federal power and not a state
police power).
53. DRAHOZAL, supra note 26, at 112.
54. See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 371
(5th Cir. 2005) ("To our knowledge... no court in this country has considered the [CAN-
SPAM Act]'s preemption clause. This is therefore an issue of very, very first impres-
sion."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
55. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1261-62 (2002);
State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 409-13 (Wash. 2001).
56. See Ferguson, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1266-69 (holding that a California spam regula-
tion that was narrowly written to apply only to state residents constituted a legitimate use
of the state police power); Heckel, 24 P.3d at 836 (holding that because spam burdens ISPs
and individual users, there is a "legitimate local purpose" in regulating spain). The court's
reasoning in Heckel demonstrates why a spain regulation is a legitimate use of the state
police power. In Heckel, a spammer challenged on dormant commerce clause grounds a
state law that prohibited falsities in spain messages. Heckel, 24 P.3d at 407-08. Although
the law burdened spammers by requiring truthful e-mail messages, the benefits to ISPs and
consumers of receiving truthful e-mail messages outweighed any costs to spammers. See
id. at 409-11.
57. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although the First Amendment only limits federal actions,
it has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states. See JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 368-69 (6th ed. 2000).
59. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
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an economic interest; (2) a consumer's interest in advertisements; and (3)
society's interest in the free flow of commercial information.60 From the
beginning, however, the Court recognized that false or misleading com-
mercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment and could be
regulated without restriction.61
Over time, the Supreme Court narrowed the right of commercial
speech and increasingly recognized that the government's interest in
regulating commercial speech outweighed any First Amendment protec-
tions." In the landmark decision of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission,63 the Supreme Court announced a four-
part test to access the constitutionality of a government regulation of
commercial speech: (1) whether the speech is fraudulent or lawful; (2)
whether there is a substantial state interest in regulating the speech; (3)
whether the regulation directly advances the state interest; and (4)
whether the state regulation is no more extensive than necessary to ad-
vance the government interest.6 The Supreme Court has since relaxed
the fourth prong to require only that a regulation be "narrowly tailored"
to meet a substantial state interest.65
Over the past three decades, courts have used the Central Hudson test
to analyze commercial speech regulations in a variety of forums, includ-
ing mail, telephones, and faxes.6 From these cases, several major pat-
terns emerge that are particularly relevant to government regulation of
spam. First, the Supreme Court treats unsolicited communications the
same as solicited communications -both are analyzed under the Central
60. Id. at 762-64.
61. See id. at 772; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). Because the First Amendment is only concerned with "the
informational function of advertising," governments are free to regulate commercial mes-
sages that are untruthful or illegal. Id. at 563-64. Thus, the government has power to "ban
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it." Id. at 563.
62. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) ("[T]he right of
every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to com-
municate."); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("[T]he
State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public
whenever speech is a component of that activity.").
63. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
64. Id. at 566.
65. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); see also United States v. Edge
Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1993) (holding that the third and fourth prongs of Cen-
tral Hudson require there to be a tight "'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends"). This test, otherwise known as the "narrowly tailored"
test, is easier to meet than the "least restrictive means" test. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 58, at 1144-45.
66. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1983) (unsolic-
ited advertisements sent via the postal service); Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d
649, 658 (8th Cir. 2003) (unsolicited faxes); State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d
882, 891-92 (Minn. 1992) (pre-recorded, unsolicited telephone calls).
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Hudson test.61 Second, courts have generally favored opt-out schemes
rather than complete bans on commercial speech.68
Most importantly, in assessing the government's interest in regulating
unsolicited commercial speech, courts will often focus on the burden the
advertisement imposes on consumers.69 Courts have sometimes held that
the protection of privacy rights is not enough to justify a finding of sub-
stantial government interest.70 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 71 the Supreme Court held that the federal government did not
have a substantial interest in restricting direct mailings of unsolicited con-
72
traceptive advertisements. Here, the commercial speech right out-
weighed the consumer's minimal burden of discarding unwanted mail.73
Other times, courts have concluded that consumer rights are burdened
and that a substantial state interest exists.74 In Missouri v. American Blast
67. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69-70 n.18 (arguing that because a chosen medium of
speech deserves full free speech protections even though alternative forms are available,
unsolicited mail should receive the same protection as solicited mail).
68. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (holding that an
opt-out statutory requirement for sexually provocative mail advertisements is a constitu-
tional restriction on commercial speech); see also Dominique-Chantale Alepin, "Opting-
Out": A Technical, Legal and Practical Look at the CAN-Spam Act of 2003, 28 CoLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 41, 56-58 (2004) (arguing that opt-out schemes are preferred to complete bans
on commercial speech).
69. See, e.g., Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655 (holding that the government has a sub-
stantial interest in regulating junk faxes "in order to prevent the cost shifting and interfer-
ence such unwanted advertising places on the recipient"); see also Joshua A.T. Fairfield,
Cracks in the Foundation: The New Internet Legislation's Hidden Threat to Privacy and
Commerce, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1193, 1234 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Bolger
and Rowan employed balancing tests to determine the intrusiveness of unsolicited mailings
by weighing commercial speech rights against the privacy interests of mail recipients).
70. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185-89
(1999) (questioning government contention that restrictions on gambling advertisements
are necessary to combat societal ills flowing from gambling); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 75 (hold-
ing that the burden of discarding unsolicited "junk" mail is minimal and does not outweigh
commercial speech protections).
71. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
72. Id. at 72.
73. Id. (reasoning that unsolicited mail does not impose a significant cost on an indi-
vidual as the "'short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an accept-
able burden"' (omission in original) (quoting Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F.
Supp. 880,883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))).
74. See, e.g., Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that there is a substantial state interest in implementing a national opt-in registry
prohibiting unsolicited commercial telephone calls because of the privacy interests of indi-
viduals in their homes); Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655 (holding that a substantial state
interest exists in preventing costs borne by fax recipients including ink costs and paper
costs); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the finding that a sub-
stantial interest exists in protecting privacy rights of individuals who receive pre-recorded
telephone calls).
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Fax,75 the Eighth Circuit upheld a federal law that prohibited unsolicited
76commercial faxes. The court found a substantial state interest in pro-
tecting consumers from clogged phone lines and wasted ink-both the
77result of junk faxes. As a whole, the case law lacks clarity on the extent
of the burden that is necessary to justify a finding of a substantial state
interest.
78
3. Law of State Action
The advent of public ISPs has created a new regulatory area where the
government and private parties interact to provide e-mail to the public.9
This, in turn, raises the issue of state action.8° The First Amendment only
limits governmental conduct, not the actions of private parties.81 How-
ever, under the doctrine of state action, the law will treat a private party
as the state when the action of the private party "can fairly be attributed
to the State." '
75. 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
76. Id. at 660.
77. Id. at 654-55.
78. The case law is so unpredictable that different courts facing similar sets of facts
have come to polar opposite conclusions on whether or not privacy rights are burdened.
Compare State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 892 (Minn. 1992) (holding
that a substantial state interest exists in the regulation of pre-recorded unsolicited tele-
phone calls because of the intrusive and highly impersonal nature of the calls), with Ly-
saght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 653 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a ban on pre-
recorded telephone calls is unconstitutional because such calls do not intrude on privacy
rights).
79. See, e.g., Greg Lalas, The Year of Living Wirelessly, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Apr.
24, 2005, at 30 (describing how municipal Internet services offer wi-fi users free access to e-
mail providers); Alex L. Goldfayn, Wi-Fi Opens Web Possibilities-and the Outdoors, CHI.
TRIB., May 8, 2004, § 2, at 4 (noting that public Internet offers residents free e-mail ac-
cess).
80. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 58, at 550 (explaining that state action suits
arise when a litigant claims that the actions of a private party "involve sufficient govern-
mental action so that they are subjected to the values and limitations reflected in the Con-
stitution and its Amendments"). Courts previously rejected attempts to hold private e-
mail providers liable as state actors, in part because the government had no role in block-
ing or allowing e-mail to flow onto networks. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1996). With public ISPs, however, the state
now participates in providing residents access to e-mail services. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
81. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he principle has become firmly
embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.").
82. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 306
(2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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There are four general categories of state action that are recognized by
the Supreme Court.83 First, under the "public function" doctrine, courts
will treat a private party as the state if the private party acts in a capacity
traditionally reserved for the state.5 Second, under the state involvement
doctrine, a private party will be treated like a state actor if there is a "suf-
ficiently close nexus" between the action of the private party and the
state so that "the action of the [private party] may be fairly treated as that
of the State itself."85 Third, under the encouragement test, if the state
commands, encourages, or directs a private party's actions, courts may
find that the private party should be treated as a state actor.5 6 Finally,
courts recognize a "symbiotic relationship" category where state action
will be found if a mutually beneficial relationship exists.'
Many state action suits seeking to hold a utility company or telecom-
munications firm liable as a state actor have failed.88 On the one hand,
courts have rejected applying the public function doctrine to utility com-
panies.89 On the other hand, courts have held that extensive state regula-
tion of a utility does not automatically lead to a finding of state action;
there must be a sufficiently close "nexus" between the utility and the
state to constitute state action.90 The quantum of proof needed to dem-
83. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 58, at 567-80 (outlining the
Court's recognition of state action).
84. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). Under the public function test, not
all activities that the government could perform are considered public functions. Jackson
v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1974). Courts will only find the existence of a
public function if the activity at issue is one "traditionally associated with sovereign gov-
ernments" and "operated almost exclusively by governmental entities." NOWAK & Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 58, at 558.
85. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176
(1972)).
86. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
87. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 58, at 579-80.
88. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59 (rejecting the argument that a heavily regu-
lated public utility is a state actor); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (declining to treat a private ISP as a state actor); Boudette
v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 685 F. Supp. 210, 213 (D. Ariz. 1988) (declining to hold a public
utility company as a state actor even though the company enjoyed a monopoly status and
was heavily regulated by the state). But see Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a county attorney's rec-
ommendation to a telephone company to refuse to carry an adult entertainment company's
messages constituted a state action violation); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717,
722 (D. Kan. 1972) (holding a private utility company liable as a state actor, primarily
because the company was given a broad grant of authority by the state).
89. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353 (holding that utility service "is not traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State").
90. Id. at 350-51. In Jackson, the plaintiff sued a private utility company for cutting
off her electricity, arguing that the utility company was a state actor. Id. at 346-48. Plain-
tiff advanced three arguments to support her state action theory: (1) the utility was a mo-
nopoly; (2) the utility provided an essential public service; and (3) the termination practice
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onstrate this nexus is significant, and courts have been reluctant to find
it.
91
Courts that have considered the issue of whether private ISPs are state
actors have consistently rejected this contention.9 For example, in Cyber
Promotions, Inc. v. American Online, Inc. ,9 a Pennsylvania district court
rejected a spammer's claim that America Online (AOL) operated as
"public system subject to the First Amendment." 94 The court concluded
that AOL was not a public actor exercising a traditional state power.95
This holding has been approved by legal commentators.?
B. The CAN-SPAM Regulatory World: State Laws Preempted, ISPs
Exempted
To understand the Fifth Circuit's decision in White Buffalo Ventures, it
is important to examine the CAN-SPAM Act and the regulatory envi-
ronment that prompted its enactment. 9 Since the expansion of the Inter-
net in the mid-1990s,98 providers of Internet access have been, for the
was authorized and approved by the state. Id. at 351-54. The Supreme Court found that
this was not a sufficient nexus such that the utility company could be treated as the state.
Id. at 350-51.
91. See id. at 350-51 (holding that private utility that is heavily regulated and enjoys a
partial monopoly does not have a sufficient nexus of contacts with the government for a
finding of state action). Contacts between a utility and a state that have been held insuffi-
cient to constitute a nexus include monopoly status, see Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451, 462 (1952), and speech restrictions built into tariff filings, see Carlin Commc'n,
Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 1986).
92. See, e.g., Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that defendant was not an "instrument or agent" of the government); Noah v. AOL Time
Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003) (finding AOL not to be a state ac-
tor); Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 445 (holding that defendant was not a state actor).
93. 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
94. Id. at 450.
95. Id. at 451 (holding that "neither the Internet itself nor AOL's accessway to the
Internet involve the exercise of any of the municipal powers or public services traditionally
exercised by the State so as to constitute a public system for purposes of the First Amend-
ment" (emphasis omitted)).
96. See Irina Dmitrieva, Will Tomorrow Be Free? Application of State Action Doc-
trine to Private Internet Providers, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL: RAISING QUESTIONS,
SEEKING ANSWERS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 3, 21 (Ingo Vogelsang & Benjamin M.
Compaine eds., 2000) (concluding that state action does not apply to private Internet pro-
viders). But see Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
1263, 1307 (2000) (arguing that private ISPs should be treated as state actors in order to
extend important free speech rights to Internet communications).
97. See infra notes 98-116.
98. See Jed Kolko, The Death of Cities? The Death of Distance? Evidence from the
Geography of Commercial Internet Usage, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL: RAISING
QUESTIONS, SEEKING ANSWERS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, supra note 96, at 73, 74-
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most part, private entities.99 Not surprisingly, courts have treated ISPs as
private parties separate from the state, and allowed ISPs to regulate e-
mail without governmental interference.' °° Legislatures also adopted a
hands-off approach to the Internet and provided ISPs with broad protec-
tions to encourage Internet development and innovation. 1
However, the problem of spam increasingly spurred legislative efforts
in the states to control the flow of spam. °2 These laws varied considera-
bly in their regulation of spam 03 and private parties that engaged in
Internet transactions had a difficult time complying with the patchwork
of laws.' °4
75 (noting that between 1994 and 1998, there was an 11% monthly increase in registered
Internet domains).
99. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting a host of
private parties that provide Internet access including commercial entities, non-profit or-
ganizations, national online services, and local dial-in computer services), affd, 521 U.S.
884 (1997).
100. See, e.g., Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000); Cyber
Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 445; Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 311 (Cal. 2003). From
the beginning of Internet litigation, courts have distinguished private ISPs from public
Internet providers. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (noting that Internet
access provided by businesses and national "online services" is separate from Internet
access provided by communities, local libraries, and colleges and universities). Courts
allowed private ISPs to regulate e-mail without any First Amendment restraints because
they exhibited no characteristics of a state actor. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp.
at 442-45.
101. See generally Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Inter-
net, the First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1965-66
n.107 (1997) (outlining the hands-off approach to the Internet that was adopted by Presi-
dent Clinton and Congress in the mid- to late- 1990s). Legislation passed during this pe-
riod manifested a hands-off approach to the Internet and sought to encourage its devel-
opment without burdensome legal restraints. See Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, No.
02-1964, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, at *6-8 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002) (noting that the
Communications Decency Act was passed to "'promote the continued development of the
internet . . . unfettered by federal or state regulation"' (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)));
see also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (stating that one of the purposes behind the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 is to "regulat[e] interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available... a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service .... ).
102. See Ford, supra note 16, at 356 (noting that 36 states enacted spam regulations
prior to the CAN-SPAM Act).
103. Id at 363 (noting that "[state spam] laws vary widely in scope," from labeling laws
to sweeping spam prohibitions); see also Sullivan & de Leeuw, supra note 16, at 888 (de-
scribing state approaches to regulating spam prior to the CAN-SPAM Act).
104. See Legislative Efforts to Combat Spam: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 55 (2003) [here-
inafter House Energy and Commerce Spam Hearings] (statement of Kenneth Hirschman,
Vice President and General Counsel, Digital Impact, Inc.) (arguing that the varied state
spam regulations have created "an unnecessarily complex compliance system"); see also
House Judiciary Spam Hearings, supra note 11, at 23 (statement of Joseph S. Rubin, Senior
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By 2003, the sheer volume of spam threatened the future of e-• • 105
commerce and Internet communications. In light of these concerns,
Congress passed the CAN-SPAM Act in 2003 to provide a uniform sys-
tem of regulation and to help combat the growing problem of spam.
Although legislators trumpeted the CAN-SPAM Act as a significant
milestone in restricting the flow of all spam,1°7 the legislation, in reality,
distinguished fraudulent and misleading spam from legitimate spam,
l08
and allowed legitimate spam to continue.)° Thus, the CAN-SPAM Act
provided harsh penalties for spammers responsible for fraudulent or mis-
leading spam, but only regulated legitimate spammers. 10
Director of Public and Congressional Affairs and Executive Director of Technology and e-
Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (noting that state spain regulations constitute a
"patchwork system" that is "unnecessarily complex").
105. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 2, 6-7 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348,
2348-49, 2352-53. Congress estimated that spam constituted over 46% of all worldwide e-
mail in 2003. Id. at 2, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2349. Research analysts estimated that spam
was likely to cost U.S. businesses ten billion dollars in 2003 alone due to "lost productivity,
network system upgrades, unrecoverable data, and increased personnel costs." Id. at 7,
2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2353. As to individual e-mail users, experts noted the frustration
associated with wading through spam, and the costs incurred to dial-up users paying for
time spent deleting spam. Id. at 6-7, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2353.
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(12), (b)(1) (Supp. III 2003) (finding that the federal gov-
ernment has a role to play in regulating and reducing the amount of spam on the Internet
and that a substantial interest exists in a nationwide span regulatory scheme).
107. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. H12,193 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Wilson) (announcing that the CAN-SPAM Act targets junk e-mail and will allow Ameri-
cans to "take ... back and own [the Internet] without an encumbrance by sparnmers").
108. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 2-5, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2348-52 (describing the two-
fold purpose of the CAN-SPAM Act: to protect legitimate commercial e-mail, and to pro-
hibit false and misleading spam). Congress believed that fraudulent and misleading spam
posed the primary Internet danger, not legitimate spam. As noted in the CAN-SPAM Act:
It is the sense of Congress that-
(1) Spam has become the method of choice for those who distribute pornography,
perpetuate fraudulent schemes, and introduce viruses, worms, and Trojan horses into
personal and business computer systems; and
(2) [T]he Department of Justice should use all existing law enforcement tools to
investigate and prosecute those who send bulk commercial e-mail to facilitate the
commission of Federal crimes ....
15 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Thus, the CAN-SPAM Act targeted fraudulent and misleading e-
mail, but allowed legitimate spam to continue under certain regulations. S. REP. No. 108-
170, at 1 (2003).
109. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 2, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2349 (noting that "legitimate
businesses... wish to use commercial e-mail as another channel for marketing products or
services"). Interestingly enough, the initial draft of the CAN-SPAM Act identified "a
right of free speech on the Internet" and acknowledged spain as a "mechanism through
which businesses advertise and attract customers in the online environment." 149 CONG.
REC. S5204 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003).
110. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704-06. The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits spain that contains both
false or misleading sender information, as well as false or misleading subject headings. Id.
§ 7704(a)(1)-(2). More importantly, the CAN-SPAM Act makes violation of these provi-
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Congress included two important provisions in the CAN-SPAM Act to
define its scope."' First, with the exception of state statutes relating to
false or misleading e-mail, Congress explicitly preempted "any statute,
regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision ... that expressly
regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages.'
12
Congress crafted this provision under the belief that the regulation of
spam fell within Congress' interstate commerce power."'
Second, the CAN-SPAM Act exempts "providers of Internet access
service," or ISPs, from the federal law.14 Congress imported the defini-
tion of "Internet access service" from the Internet Tax Freedom Act,
which defines Internet access service as "a service that enables users to
access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered
over the Internet."''. Both the CAN-SPAM Act and the committee re-
ports accompanying the bills did not describe the scope of this defini-
tion."'
sions a criminal act and provides for civil enforcement by federal and state authorities. Id.
§§ 7704(a)(1)-(2), 7706. In regard to legitimate spam, there are only a few provisions that
restrict e-mail content. Section 7704(a)(3) requires all legitimate spam senders to include
options for e-mail recipients to opt out of receiving future messages. Id. § 7704(a)(3)(A)-
(C). Section 7705(a) requires all businesses to comply with CAN-SPAM provisions that
prohibit fraudulent and misleading e-mail. Id. § 7705(a). Other than this, the CAN-SPAM
Act does nothing to restrict legitimate spam operations. See, e.g., Sullivan & de Leeuw,
supra note 16, at 895 (noting that the primary criticism of the CAN-SPAM Act was that it
"provides a federal imprimatur for unsolicited e-mail by deeming it presumptively law-
ful").
111. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1).
113. S. REP. No. 108-102, at 21-22, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2365. The report from the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation argues:
Given the inherently interstate nature of e-mail communications, the Committee be-
lieves that this bill's creation of one national standard is a proper exercise of the Con-
gress's power to regulate interstate commerce that is essential to resolving the signifi-
cant harms from spam faced by American consumers, organizations, and businesses
throughout the United States.
Id. at 21,2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2365.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(c) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to have any
effect on ... the adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider of Internet ac-
cess service of a policy of declining to transmit, route, relay, handle, or store certain types
of electronic mail messages.").
115. See id. § 7702(11) ("The term 'Internet access service' has the meaning given that
term in section 231(e)(4) of title 47.").
116. The CAN-SPAM Act imports the "Internet access service" definition without any
comment on its scope. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The committee reports
describing the CAN-SPAM Act both lack any discussion concerning the intended scope of
the term "Internet access service." See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 15, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2360; S. REP. No. 108-170, at 5-6 (2003).
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C. The Fifth Circuit's Dilemma in White Buffalo Ventures: Is a Univer-
sity ISP Preempted or Exempted Under the CAN-SPAM Act?
Almost immediately after the CAN-SPAM Act was signed into law, a
novel question arose concerning the application of the CAN-SPAM Act
to a public university with Internet and e-mail services.'1 7 The University
of Texas at Austin (UT) enforced a general anti-solicitation policy that
forbade solicitations on its campus and e-mail servers."'8 White Buffalo
Ventures (White Buffalo), a provider of online dating services, sent e-
mails through UT's servers to solicit students.119 After having its e-mails
blocked by UT's servers, White Buffalo sought an injunction to prohibit
UT from this practice. ° White Buffalo argued that UT's prohibition
violated its free speech rights, conflicted with the Equal Protection
Clause, and was preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act."' UT responded
with a public policy argument, contending that if the CAN-SPAM Act
preempted UT's solicitation policy, UT would be unable to filter any
122
spam.
The district court granted UT's motion for summary judgment and up-
held UT's solicitation ban as applied to e-mail.' 3 The district court pre-
sented two rationales for its decision. First, the court found that the
124CAN-SPAM Act did not preempt UT's regulation. Although the court
advanced several reasons for this holding,1' its most plausible argument
was that UT, as a provider of Internet access service, was expressly ex-
empted from the federal law.1 26 Second, the court found that UT's policy
would "easily survive" a commercial speech challenge because of the
117. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 371 (5th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
118. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. A-03-CA-296-SS,
2004 WL 1854168, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22,2004), affd, 420 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2005).
119. Id.
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *7.
124. Id. at *4.
125. Id. at *3-4. The district court held that because UT's spain policy was an off-shoot
of its larger solicitation policy, it was not a regulation relating to spain that was preempted
by the CAN-SPAM Act. Id. at *3. Additionally, the court posited that it was not clear
that UT was a state subdivision for purposes of regulation under the CAN-SPAM Act. Id.
Finally, in interpreting congressional intent, the court looked at the cost and scope of the
spam problem, and concluded that Congress surely did not intend for colleges and univer-
sities to be handcuffed in combating span. Id. at *4.
126. See id. at *3 ("UT is certainly a provider of Internet access service... and as such,
is expressly authorized under the statute to implement policies declining to transmit, route,
relay, handle or store spam.").
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substantial government interest in blocking spam and regulating univer-
sity servers.' 7
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld both of the district court's hold-
ings.12' However, the Fifth Circuit took a much more exacting approach
to both analyses.'29 In regard to preemption, the court noted that because
Congress' preemption power is "'an extraordinary power in a federalist
system,"' there is a historical presumption against preemption. '3 The
court then noted that strong arguments both for and against preemption
are "rooted firmly in the text of the [CAN-SPAM] Act.'' On the one
hand, Congress expressly preempted UT's spam regulations through the
preemption provision. 32  On the other hand, Congress expressly ex-
empted UT as an Internet access provider from the federal regulatory
113scheme. Because of these conflicting provisions, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the presumption against preemption tipped the scales toward
upholding UT's spare regulations.34
The Fifth Circuit also upheld the district court's holding that UT's
span regulations were valid under the Central Hudson commercial
speech test. 33 In applying the Central Hudson test, the court first noted
116that White Buffalo's e-mails constituted commercial solicitations. The
court then found that UT had a substantial state interest in prohibiting
spam: protecting e-mail users from unwanted spam and protecting the
speed of UT's network. 37
After giving the third Central Hudson prong only a cursory analysis,
the court carefully reviewed UT's spam regulations under the fourth
prong.1 38 Although the court found a means-ends fit between prohibiting
127. Id. at *4-6.
128. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 372 (5th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
129. See generally id. at 370-78.
130. Id. at 370 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991)).
131. Id. at 372.
132. Id. at 372 n.11.
133. ld. at 372. The Fifth Circuit tried as best it could to interpret what Congress in-
tended to fall under the term "Internet Access Provider." Id. at 373. In concluding that
the ISP definition is so vague that UT must fall under it, the court noted, "[w]e doubt that
[the] legislators responsible for passing the Internet Tax Freedom Act gave serious consid-
eration to the situation the instant facts present." Id.
134. See id. at 372 (concluding that because a public university ISP can fairly be inter-
preted to be both a provider of Internet access exempt from the CAN-SPAM Act and a
state entity preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act, the Act's "textual ambiguity triggers the
strong presumption against [preemption]").
135. Id. at 378.
136. Id. at 374.
137. Id. at 374-75.
138. Id. at 375-78.
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spam and keeping user in-boxes clean,139 the court did not find the same
fit in the server efficiency argument. 140 The court noted that the record
showed that White Buffalo could send solicitations at off-peak hours
when there was no threat of spam slowing or crashing the network.'
4
However, because one of UT's substantial interests passed the means-
ends test-the need to protect users from unwanted spam"-the court
held that the spain prohibition was constitutional.1
43
II. WHITE BUFFALO VENTURES-A BENCHMARK IN PREEMPTION AND
COMMERCIAL SPEECH LAW FOR PUBLIC ISPs LOOKING TO REGULATE
SPAM
The Fifth Circuit's preemption holding in White Buffalo Ventures has
enormous implications for a public ISP.'" Although the court's holding
could be limited to public universities, 45 its analysis, taken to its logical
end, exempts any public ISP from the CAN-SPAM Act.'4 A public ISP
is clearly a "provider of Internet access," at least as the Fifth Circuit has
interpreted this statutory phrase. 47 A public ISP could thus lawfully filter
139. Id. at 375-76.
140. Id. at 376.
141. Id. at 376-77.
142. Id. at 378.
143. Id.
144. See infra Parts II and III.
145. The Fifth Circuit only upheld the district court's limited holding that UT's spam
regulations are not preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act. See White Buffalo Ventures, 420
F.3d at 374. The Fifth Circuit never made a blanket statement that all public ISPs are
exempt from the CAN-SPAM Act. Id. at 373-74. Arguably, the ISP exemption could be
limited to public universities on policy grounds because, unlike public ISPs, these entities
directly maintain e-mail servers and would be overrun by spain if they could not regulate
it. See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. A-03-CA-296-SS,
2004 WL 1854168, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2004) (holding on policy grounds that the
exemption provision must extend to a public university to protect it from being overrun
with spam), affd, 420 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2005). Because the Supreme Court denied certiori
to the Fifth Circuit's holding, see White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006), and because the Fifth Circuit did not address this issue, see White
Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 373 n.13, this question is still open for debate.
146. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
147. The CAN-SPAM Act imports the definition for "Internet access service" from the
Internet Tax Freedom Act. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The Internet Tax
Freedom Act defines Internet access service as "a service that enables users to access con-
tent, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet." 47 U.S.C. §
231(e)(4) (2000). Under the strict textual approach employed by the Fifth Circuit, a public
ISP clearly falls under this definition. See, e.g., Lalas, supra note 79, at 32 (noting that
users access the Internet on a public network); FLA. MUN. ELEC. ASS'N, THE CASE FOR
MUNICIPAL BROADBAND IN FLORIDA 3 (2005) available at http://www.publicpower.
com/telecom study/telecomreport_2005.pdf (arguing that citizens reap economic benefits,
educational opportunities, and efficient health care from public Internet).
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spam under the CAN-SPAM exemption provision.' However, such a
regulation would also fall under the CAN-SPAM preemption provision
because it is a law prohibiting spam.149 This would, in turn, trigger "tex-
tual ambiguity" between the exemption and preemption provisions,"'°
which is indicative of unclear congressional intent.' In light of this, and
because of the presumption against preemption, the regulation would be
upheld and the public ISP could regulate spam without the limitations of
the CAN-SPAM Act' 2
A public ISP would face practical hurdles in administering a spam pro-.' 53
hibition because it neither provides e-mail services nor directly controls
the flow of e-mail on the Internet. However, if a state allows municipal
broadband 5' and authorizes unrestricted local legislation, a city with
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(c) (Supp. III 2003) (allowing providers of an "Internet access
service" to filter all e-mail messages).
149. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
150. See White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372 (concluding that the CAN-SPAM Act
is "textual[ly] ambigu[ous]" because the UT regulation, as a public regulation issued by an
Internet access provider, logically falls under both the preemption and exemption provi-
sions).
151. The Fifth Circuit held that because of "textual ambiguity," there was no clear
congressional intent as to what Congress intended for public universities under the CAN-
SPAM Act. See id. This is the critical step in the analysis-if congressional intent is am-
biguous, a state regulation will survive because of the presumption against preemption.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. A public ISP spain prohibition would likewise
survive under the Fifth Circuit's approach, which focuses exclusively on the plain text of
the CAN-SPAM Act to determine congressional intent. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d
at 372.
152. See White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372 (upholding a state regulation that is
ambiguous under the CAN-SPAM Act because of the presumption against preemption).
153. Public ISPs, to date, have provided Internet access to residents and local busi-
nesses, not e-mail access. See, e.g., Drew Clark, The Quest for a Municipal UTOPIA,
NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY, Aug. 15, 2005, http://njtelecomupdate.com/lenya/telco/live/tb-
JLQZ1124223622523.html (explaining that municipal broadband networks are "public
highway[s]" where participants bear the responsibility of "handl[ing] functions for Internet
services").
154. ISPs do not block spain per se; only ISPs with e-mail services have a role in block-
ing spam. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, SUBJECT LINE LABELING AS A WEAPON AGAINST
SPAM: A CAN-SPAM ACT REPORT TO CONGRESS app. II at 4-5 (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/050616canspamrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC SUBJECT
LINE LABELING REPORT] (describing the process of sending an e-mail from one computer
to another and noting that e-mail can only be blocked between e-mail servers). Thus, a
public ISP without e-mail services cannot directly block spam.
155. See Free Press, Community Internet: Broadband as a Public Service,
http://www.freepress.net/communityinternet/=states (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (noting that
fifteen states currently ban or curtail municipal broadband state-wide, and nine more are
considering prohibitions of some kind).
156. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdi-
visions § 107 (2000) (noting that in states with constitutions that do not grant municipalities
the inherent right of self-government, local authorities cannot legislate without authoriza-
tion from state legislatures).
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municipal broadband, as a legislative entity, has the power to enact spam
regulations.1 7  Under the Fifth Circuit's rationale, a public ISP's spam
prohibition would not be preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act"' and
would survive commercial speech scrutiny.59 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's
holdings must be scrupulously reviewed to determine whether a public
ISP spam prohibition would withstand judicial scrutiny. 6"°
A. The Preemption Holding: The Presumption Against Preemption Over-
comes Unclear Congressional Intent
The Fifth Circuit's preemption decision in White Buffalo Ventures turns
on two critical points: (1) the court's analysis of congressional intent; and
(2) the court's application of the presumption against preemption."' To
assess the Fifth Circuit's analysis, it is helpful to reference the Supreme
Court's decision in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League.162 On the facts,
Nixon and White Buffalo Ventures are different.'63 However, in both
cases the courts looked to congressional intent to interpret the scope of
statutory provisions. Additionally, both courts used the presumption
against preemption to uphold state regulations against preemption chal-
lenges. Finally, as two recent telecommunications decisions involving
preemption,' 66 both decisions offer insight as to how preemption law is
167applied in this field.
157. Although most state constitutions do not grant municipalities the inherent right of
local rule, see id., forty states have enacted "home-rule" statutes that allow cities and mu-
nicipalities to legislate without prior state authorization. See Diane Lang, Dillon's Rule...
And the Birth of Home Rule, MUN. REP., Dec. 1991, available at http://www.nmml.
org/Dillon.pdf. Thus, a public ISP operating in a "home-rule" state where state law does
not prohibit local spam regulations arguably has the "home-rule" power to ban spam.
158. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
159. See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 378
(5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a government entity can constitutionally ban spain on its
servers under the Central Hudson test), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
160. See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Part I.C.
162. 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
163. Nixon involved the interpretation of a vague statutory provision, see supra note 45
and accompanying text, whereas White Buffalo Ventures involved the interpretation of two
provisions that, as applied to public universities, were seemingly contradictory. See supra
notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
164. Compare Nixon, 541 U.S. at 133 (adopting a "broader frame of reference" in
order to "get at Congress's understanding"), with White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372-
73 (interpreting the text of the CAN-SPAM Act to determine Congress' purpose).
165. Compare Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140 (invoking the "working assumption" that federal
law encroaching on traditional state regulatory powers "should be treated with great skep-
ticism"), with White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372 (noting that the ambiguous language
of the CAN-SPAM Act "triggers" the presumption against preemption).
166. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 125; White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 366.
167. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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1. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Fifth Circuit's Plain Text
Approach in Determining Congressional Intent
Both the Nixon and White Buffalo Ventures courts initially looked for
congressional intent in the language of the statutory provisions at issue.'
61
In Nixon, the Court looked at the plain meaning of section 254 of the
Telecommunications Act to determine if Congress intended for state
subdivisions to fall under this definition. '69 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
scrutinized the language of the CAN-SPAM Act's exemption and pre-
emption provisions to determine what Congress intended to do for public
universities.
170
Beyond this, both analyses diverge. The Nixon Court, in looking for
congressional intent, adopted a "broader frame of reference" that looked
beyond the plain text of section 247 to such things as policy considera-
tions, statutory structure, and legislative history.171 Conversely, the Fifth
Circuit focused exclusively on the text of the exemption and preemption
provisions to determine congressional intent.172 In fact, the Fifth Circuit
specifically declined at one point to allow policy considerations to impact
its holding.
1 7 1
The Fifth Circuit's plain text approach certainly has its merits. When
interpreting the scope of an express preemption provision, the plain text
should be the primary focus.1 74 Additionally, policy considerations are
168. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 131-33 (examining the meaning of "any entity" at the outset
before a full-blown inquiry into congressional intent); White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at
371-72 (reviewing the text of the preemption and exemption provisions at the start of the
preemption analysis).
169. Nixon, 541 U.S. at 132-33 (concluding that the plain text meaning of "any entity"
is insufficient "[tlo get at Congress's understanding").
170. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372-73 (analyzing the interplay of the exemp-
tion and preemption provisions as applied to public universities under the CAN-SPAM
Act).
171. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 133 ("To get at Congress's understanding, what is needed is
a broader frame of reference .... "). As part of this broader frame approach, the Supreme
Court looked at policy considerations, statutory structure, and legislative history. Id. at
133-38, 141. This approach mirrors the sweeping review advocated by Justice White in
Mortier. See supra note 40.
172. See supra notes 134, 140-43 and accompanying text (describing the Fifth Circuit's
step-by-step textual analysis that eventually led to a rejection of the preemption argu-
ment). The Fifth Circuit's preemption approach parallels that of Justice Scalia where the
plain text of a statute should determine congressional intent, not legislative history. See
supra note 39.
173. See White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 373 n.13 (declining to interpret the CAN-
SPAM Act's exemption provision under the rationale that it is "unusual policy" for private
educational institutions to filter spare, but not public educational institutions). Proponents
of a plain text approach also disapprove of using policy considerations to justify a preemp-
tion holding. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 141 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting policy arguments
to justify the majority's holding).
174. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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better left to legislative bodies and should not factor into a preemption
holding."' The plain text of the CAN-SPAM Act's exemption provision
is broad and applies to almost any entity that provides Internet service,
including public universities. Because the statutory language is so am-
biguous, any inquiry into legislative history-a tool which is inherently
unreliable-would be fruitless and unnecessary.177
The Fifth Circuit's plain text approach, however, also has shortcomings,
primarily failing to consider all relevant sources of congressional intent.178
First, other CAN-SPAM provisions suggest that Congress did not intend
for all entities providing Internet access, public and private alike, to qual-
ify as ISPs. 1 79 In the findings section of the statute, Congress explicitly
referenced educational and nonprofit institutions as being separate from
ISPs 8° Because this distinction is not made in the exemption provision," '
a negative inference is created that Congress did not intend for universi-
182ties or nonprofits to be an ISP exempt from the CAN-SPAM Act.
175. See supra note 173.
176. See supra note 114. The definition of Internet access service is also very broad
and can legitimately be construed to apply to any entity providing Internet access. See
supra note 147 and accompanying text; see also White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 373
("[W]e are hard-pressed to find that providing e-mail accounts and e-mail access does not
bring UT within the statutory definition borrowed from the Internet Tax Freedom Act.").
177. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (positing that in statutory interpretation,
courts "should try to give the text its fair meaning, whatever various committees might
have had to say-thereby affirming the proposition that we are a Government of laws, not
of committee reports").
178. See White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 370-73 (relying exclusively on the text of
the CAN-SPAM Act's exemption and preemption provisions in holding that preemption
did not occur).
179. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(6) (Supp. III 2003) ("The growth in unsolicited commer-
cial electronic mail imposes significant monetary costs on providers of Internet access ser-
vice, businesses, and educational and nonprofit institutions that carry and receive such mail,
as there is a finite volume of mail that such providers, businesses, and institutions can han-
dle without further investment in infrastructure." (emphasis added)). This same distinc-
tion was made in the Senate committee report that accompanied the original draft of the
CAN-SPAM Act. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 3 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2348, 2349 ("[T]he sheer volume of SPAM is threatening to overwhelm not only the aver-
age consumer's in-box, but also network systems of ISPs, businesses, universities, and other
organizations." (emphasis added)).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(c).
182. The Supreme Court has endorsed using negative inferences to determine congres-
sional intent. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S.
246, 261 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (using negative implication to interpret a provision
of the Clean Air Act); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.").
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Second, the CAN-SPAM Act's regulatory scheme suggests that Con-
gress intended for the ISP exemption to have some limits.'8 In the con-
gressional findings, Congress stated that the purpose of the CAN-SPAM
Act was to provide a "nationwide" regulatory scheme because of "differ-
ent [state] standards and requirements."1" Any interpretation of the ISP
exemption that incorporates state subdivisions - a category that includes
public universities -directly conflicts with the statutory intent to pro-
vide uniform regulations at the state and federal level.' 86 The CAN-
SPAM Act's enforcement mechanisms also suggest that Congress viewed
ISPs as entities separate from state and federal governments and their
subdivisions.' 87 Congress specifically provided ISPs a private right of ac-
tion to bring civil suits against violators of the CAN-SPAM Act.' 88 This
right of action is distinct from the rights of action that Congress provided
to federal and state plaintiffs to enforce the CAN-SPAM Act.189
The legislative history also demonstrates that Congress viewed ISPs as
private entities that should be free to regulate span without restrat.'
183. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text. Using a statute's regulatory
scheme to determine congressional intent is a generally accepted method of statutory
construction. See supra note 36.
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11), (b)(1).
185. See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 373
(5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the "suggestion" that a public university is not a state subdivi-
sion "is incorrect and requires little explanation"), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
186. See id. at 373 (admitting that a fair reading of the preemption provision must
necessarily include public universities as state subdivisions).
187. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g).
189. Compare id. § 7706(a)-(e) (providing various civil and criminal enforcement
measures to federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission), with id. § 7706(f)
(granting states and state agencies the power to bring civil actions and recover damages
against violators of the CAN-SPAM Act).
190. In hearings before Senate and House committees, witnesses characterized ISPs as
private entities that filter spam without government restraint. See House Judiciary Spam
Hearings, supra note 11, at 23-24 (statement of Joseph Rubin, Senior Director of Public
and Congressional Affairs and Executive Director of Technology and e-Commerce, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce) (arguing that federal legislation combating spam should not im-
pact ISPs that are private networks); see also House Energy and Commerce Spam Hear-
ings, supra note 104, at 44-45 (statement of Ira Rubinstein, Associate General Counsel,
Microsoft Corp.) (positing that ISPs, as separate from the government, should be allowed
to filter spare under federal law). Not surprisingly, this paradigm of ISPs as private entities
regularly appeared in statements by members of Congress. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC.
H12860 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (discussing how the
filtering capabilities of ISPs and consumers are more effective than the actions of the gov-
ernment in stopping the flow of spam); 149 CONG. REC. S13,020 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003)
(statement of Sen. McCain) ("Internet service provider [sic] are the businesses caught in
the middle, forced every day to draw distinctions between what they perceive as legitimate
e-mail and what is spam.").
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In hearings leading up to the CAN-SPAM Act, private ISPs advocated
that they had an important role to play in combating spam.'9' To do this,
private ISPs requested that Congress allow them to continue unfettered
filtering of spam,'92 and to give them a civil cause of action under the
CAN-SPAM Act. 93 Congress, in turn, trumpeted private ISPs as impor-
tant players in the spain war, 94 and provided for their requests in the
CAN-SPAM Act. 95
2. The Presumption Against Preemption Controls in the Absence of
Clear Congressional Intent
Regardless of whether the Fifth Circuit's plain text approach is correct,
without clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent, the pre-
sumption against preemption controls.' 96 This raises the issue of whether
the Fifth Circuit properly employed the presumption against preemption.
191. See, e.g., House Energy and Commerce Spam Hearings, supra note 104, at 44
(statement of Ira Rubinstein, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corp.) (recommend-
ing a balanced approach to fight spain that includes private ISPs developing sophisticated
filtering technology to stop the flow of spam).
192. See id. at 34 (statement of Charles Garry Betty, President and CEO, EarthLink)
("[Earthlink] support[s] the provision in several bills which note that they place no restric-
tions on an ISP's current ability to block spam on behalf of its customers."); see also Letter
from Bill Gates, Chairman and Chief Software Architect, Microsoft Corp., to the U.S.
Senate Commerce Comm. (May 21, 2003), available at http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/misc/Billgspam05-21-03.mspx (arguing that federal legislation should include
"[e]xpress language that preserves the right of ISPs to combat spam").
193. See House Energy and Commerce Spam Hearings, supra note 104, at 34 (state-
ment of Charles Garry Betty, President and CEO, EarthLink) ("[Earthlink] support[s] the
provision in various bills that note that ISPs have a right of action to pursue legal action
against spammers."); Letter from Bill Gates to the U.S. Senate Commerce Comm., supra
note 192 (noting that any spain law should provide "[e]ffective Internet service provider
... enforcement that allows ISPs to prosecute spammers on behalf of their customers").
194. See, e.g., Spam (Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://commerce.
senate.gov/hearings/index.cfm?cong=108&sessn=l&subc=999 (follow "Spam (Unsolicited
Commercial E-Mail)" hyperlink) [hereinafter Senate Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion Spam Hearing] (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (advocating that Congress should
"give law enforcement officials, ISPs and others a wide variety of tools to fight spain"); 149
CONG. REC. H12,860 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("Ulti-
mately, spam will be stopped by a combination of new technology, consumer awareness,
ISP filtering, and trusted sender systems for legitimate senders of commercial e-mail
195. The CAN-SPAM Act exempts ISPs from the federal regulatory scheme, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7707(c) (Supp. III 2003), and provides a civil cause of action for ISPs. Id. § 7706(g)(1).
196. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that the presumption against
preemption can only be overcome if there is clear and convincing evidence).
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In Nixon, the Supreme Court applied the presumption against preemp-
tion because a state regulatory power was at issue.r' The Court used the
presumption to hold against preemption in the absence of clear congres-
sional intent 9 The Fifth Circuit in White Buffalo Ventures used the pre-
sumption against preemption in the same manner, holding that the pre-
sumption overcame ambiguous statutory language.' 9
However, unlike the Nixon Court, the Fifth Circuit never identified a
state power that triggered the presumption against preemption.2 00 Im-
plicit in the Fifth Circuit's use of the presumption against preemption is
the holding that a spam regulation is a legitimate effectuation of a state
power.20' The Fifth Circuit arguably could have held that the power to
regulate spam is part of Congress' commerce power, not a state power.2-2
The Fifth Circuit's implicit holding, however, is supported by prece-
dent.2°3 Not only did the Nixon Court recognize a state's right to regulate
its internal networks,2 but dormant commerce clause decisions have rec-
ognized the power to prohibit spam and protect state consumers as a le-
gitimate state police power.205
B. The Commercial Speech Holding- Opening the Door for Government
Entities to Constitutionally Prohibit Spain
The Fifth Circuit's commercial speech analysis in White Buffalo Ven-
tures raises again the question of whether a state can constitutionally
prohibit spam.2 In its commercial speech analysis, the Fifth Circuit fo-
197. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (finding the presumption
against preemption applicable because preemption would encroach "on the States' ar-
rangements for conducting their own governments").
198. Id. at 140-41.
199. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
200. See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 372
(5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
201. Cf id. at 369.
202. See Sabra-Anne Kelin, State Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 435, 451 (2001) (arguing that state spam prohibitions violate the
dormant commerce clause). Augmenting this argument is Congress' finding in the CAN-
SPAM Act that "there is substantial government interest in regulation of commercial
electronic mail on a nationwide basis." 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1) (Supp. III 2003) (emphasis
added). Also relevant is the committee report from the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, which posits that the CAN-SPAM Act is an effectuation of
Congress' commerce power to regulate spam. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 1-2 (2003), re-
printed in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2348-49.
203. See infra text accompanying notes 204-05.
204. See supra note 197.
205. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
206. Prior to the enactment of the CAN-SPAM Act, the constitutionality of state sparn
prohibitions as commercial speech restrictions was a hot topic. See, e.g., Joshua A. Marcus,
Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 255 (1998) (analyzing First Amendment issues dealing with spam);
[Vol. 56:609
2007] A Proposal for Cities and Municipalities to Regulate Spam 635
cused on the second and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test: the
substantial state interest test and the less burdensome alternative testyo
In regard to the substantial state interest test, the Fifth Circuit offered
little explanation for upholding UT's interest in keeping its server clear of
spam and protecting e-mail users.28 This holding is subject to criticism.2
Even without filters, spain may not have as much of an impact on band-
width capacity as the public is led to believe.210 Additionally, some stud-
ies have shown that spam is an effective marketing tool and less of an
211annoyance to e-mail users than in the past.
Conversely, studies also support the Fifth Circuit's findings that unfil-
tered spam can impact bandwidth capacity 212 and that e-mail users con-
tinue to disfavor spam.213 Under the privacy burden analysis, these bur-
dens arguably outweigh any commercial speech benefit arising from un-
filtered spam.2 14
Gary S. Moorefield, Note, Spain-It's not Just for Breakfast Anymore: Federal Legislation
and the Fight to Free the Internet from Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, 5 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 10 para. 9 (1999) (discussing First Amendment issues). However, after the CAN-
SPAM Act, focus shifted away from state regulations to the preemptive effect of the CAN-
SPAM Act. See Alepin, supra note 68, at 66 (explaining how the CAN-SPAM Act shifted
attention from state to federal regulations). In the wake of White Buffalo Ventures, focus
will likely shift again to the constitutionality of a complete ban on spam.
207. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
208. See White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 374-75 ("[W]e acknowledge as substantial
the government's gatekeeping interest in protecting users of its email network from the
hassle associated with unwanted spam. Also substantial is the 'server efficiency' interest
209. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
210. See Bayesian Spam Filters, http://www.kantor.com/usatoday/bayesian-spam_
filters.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (arguing that spain on an Internet server does not
consume enough bandwidth to crash a network).
211. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 2 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349
(noting a Direct Marketing Association report that found 37% of consumers purchased a
product as a result of a spain advertisement); see also Fallows, supra note 13, at 3-4 (noting
that in 2005, 67% of e-mail users found spam annoying or disturbing, a 10% drop from the
2004 all-time high).
212. See Jeff Mackie, McAfee Creates Security Alliance, COMPUTER DEALER NEWS,
Aug. 5, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13207975 (noting that McAfee's general manager
and senior vice president in Canada still believes that spain can negatively impact band-
width and storage); see also Joel Snyder, Symantec Slows Spam at the Edge, NETWORK
WORLD, Apr. 11, 2005, at 56, 56 (arguing that an ISP that receives large amounts of spain
hourly is wise to purchase additional spain protection beyond their filter system to ease the
burden on network bandwidth).
213. See Fallows, supra note 13, at 3-4. Although consumers are growing less annoyed
with spam, a significant number still find sparn annoying and are therefore still distrustful
of e-mail. See id. (noting that in 2005, 67% of e-mail users found sparn annoying or dis-
turbing and 53% found e-mail less trustworthy as a result of spam).
214. Compare White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366,
374-75 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that substantial interests exist both in protecting users from
the "hassle" of span and protecting the efficiency of UT's servers), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
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Regarding the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the Fifth Circuit first
held that no alternative regulation exists to protect e-mail users from215
spam. Studies increasingly show that the most effective way to stop
spain from reaching e-mail accounts is with advanced filters. One op-
tion is to block fraudulent spam, but allow all legitimate spam.2  Current
ISP practices, such as "white-listing," suggest that this is a viable alterna-
tive.218
In regard to UT's argument that server efficiency warranted a ban on
spam, the Fifth Circuit held that a less restrictive alternative existed,
namely, that UT could allow spam on its network during off-peak
hours.21 9 Here, the court limited its analysis to the effect of White Buf-
falo's spam on UT's network during off-peak hours.20 The court could
have taken an aggregate approach, however, and considered how all un-
filtered spare affects UT at off-peak hours.221 Current studies estimate
1039 (2006), with Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 2003) (con-
cluding that a substantial interest exists in protecting fax recipients from unsolicited fax
advertisements).
215. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 376.
216. See, e.g., Winning the War on Spam, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 50 (noting that
filtering technology is one of the primary reasons why spam on MessageLabs' e-mail serv-
ers fell from 83% of all e-mail in 2004 to 67% of all e-mail in early 2005); FTC SUBJECr
LINE LABELING REPORT, supra note 154, at 12 (noting that ISPs are beginning to stem the
tide of spain through advanced blocking and filtering technology). Microsoft has an-
nounced that its Hotmail filters can now block 95% of all spain that it receives. FTC SUB-
JECT LINE LABELING REPORT, supra note 154, at 12; see also Bill Gates, Preserving and
Enhancing the Benefits of Email-A Progress Report (June 28, 2004), http://www.
microsoft.com/mscorp/execmaiV2004/06-28antispam.mspx.
217. See FTC SUBJECT LINE LABELING REPORT, supra note 154, at 11 (explaining that
current technology allows ISPs to allow legal spam to enter their servers without being
filtered).
218. See id. (noting that ISPs use "whitelists" that allow them to enter IP addresses of
legitimate spam senders). As far back as the CAN-SPAM Act, ISPs used white-lists to
filter some span but allow other spam to enter their networks. See generally Senate Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation Spam Hearing, supra note 194 (testimony of Ronald
Scelson, Scelson Online Marketing) (arguing that ISPs act as censors in determining what
spam will enter their networks). In fact, reports have shown that some of the largest ISPs
are providers of spam, and employ policies restrictive of spain except their own. See House
Energy and Commerce Spam Hearings, supra note 104, at 64 (statement of Chris Murray,
Legislative Counsel, Consumers Union) (noting that ISPs send spam and desire regulatory
schemes that allow them to filter everyone else's sparn except their own).
219. See White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 376. The Fifth Circuit did not specifically
hold that off-peak hour regulations are, in fact, viable; rather, it held that UT, as the party
moving for summary judgment, failed to prove that off-peak regulations were "economi-
cally infeasible." Id. at 372.
220. See id. at 376 ("There is record testimony that White Buffalo can send a restricted
volume of email at off-peak times, so as not to impede server efficiency.").
221. See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 654-55 (8th Cir. 2003) (using an
aggregate model to hold that unsolicited faxes burden individual fax recipients); see also
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that spam accounts for approximately 60% to 80% of all e-mail. 222 Even
if just a fraction of this is legitimate spam,m this volume of e-mail could
be enough to impact a server, even at off-peak hours.
III. A POLICY PROPOSAL FOR PUBLIC ISPS SEEKING TO CHART A
COURSE IN THE POST-WHITE BUFFALO VENTURES REGULATORY
WORLD
The Fifth Circuit's decision in White Buffalo Ventures opens the door
for a public ISP to prohibit spam on its network outside of the CAN-
SPAM Act.2  A public ISP would benefit from this policy because a
network without sparn would, in theory, be more efficient 26 and draw in
new businesses and consumers.
A public ISP, however, should refrain from instituting a spam prohibi-
tion under the Fifth Circuit's holding.22 Although the Fifth Circuit's
State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 890-91 (Minn. 1992) (focusing on unso-
licited pre-recorded messages as an invasion of privacy).
222. See supra note 12.
223. See FTC SUBJECT LINE LABELING REPORT, supra note 154, at 13 (citing industry
experts who believe that "most spammers" in today's Internet world send spain that
"range from marginally legal to quite illegal"); see also Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Spam Hearing, supra note 194 (testimony of Sen. McCain) (noting that in
2003, studies estimated that two-thirds of all spam contained some deceptive information).
224. The legitimate sparn industry is massive; some figures place the value of the indus-
try at two billion dollars with estimates that it might grow to be as valuable as eight billion
dollars. See House Energy and Commerce Spam Hearings, supra note 104, at 54 (state-
ment of Kenneth Hirschman, Vice President & General Counsel, Digital Impact). Con-
sidering the threat spain poses to bandwidth, the sheer amount of legitimate spain could
impact server efficiency. Cf. Thomas Crampton, Build a Better Spam Trap and... Spam
Multiplies, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 24, 2006, at 1 (considering the threat spam poses to
bandwidth and that filtering could block legitimate e-mails).
225. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text. This statement is made with one
caveat. Even if the CAN-SPAM Act does not block a public ISP from regulating spain,
the dormant commerce clause still could block state spain regulations. See supra note 202
and accompanying text. Courts that have addressed this issue have tended to allow states
to regulate spain unhindered by the dormant commerce clause. See Ferguson v. Friend-
finders, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1266 (2002); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 413 (Wash.
2001). This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
226. See Gregg Keizer, Spare Costs Businesses Worldwide $50 Billion, INFORMATION-
WEEK, Feb. 23, 2005, available at http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.
jhtml?articlelD=60403016 (noting that in time wasted, spain imposes an annual cost of
$170 per mailbox on the average business). Additionally, a spam-free network would
result in a significant reduction of frustration for e-mail users. See supra note 213 and
accompanying text (noting that a significant number of e-mail users still find spain annoy-
ing or disturbing).
227. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that cities and municipalities
construct public networks to provide high-speed, efficient networks for local businesses
and residents).
228. See generally infra Part III.A-C.
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holding remains valid law,229 it is arguably flawed and would fail as a legal
argument to support a public ISP's sparn prohibition.2 "3 Instead, a public
ISP should adopt a hands-off approach that allows private companies to
filter spam without regulatory burdens.2 1' This will encourage private
companies to invest in filtering technology, the one approach that has
proven effective in slowing the proliferation of spam. 2  This hands-off
approach will ensure that a public ISP remains separate from private e-
mail providers, and thus avoids any future problems of state action 33
A. Public ISP Spam Regulations Would Fail Judicial Scrutiny: Congress
Intended for the CAN-SPAM Act to Preempt All Governmental Spain
Regulations
The Fifth Circuit's rationale in White Buffalo Ventures fails to accu-
rately identify Congress' intent concerning the scope of the CAN-SPAM
exemption and preemption provisions.23 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the
preemption and exemption provisions separately under a rigid textual
approach and concluded that the status of a public university was am-
biguous.2 5 However, by taking a step back and analyzing both provisions
within the overall framework of the statute, 2 6 a clear intent emerges that
Congress intended to preempt all state-level regulations and limit the
exemption provision to private parties.237
229. See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 126 S. Ct. 1039
(2006) (denying the petition for certiorari filed by White Buffalo Ventures on January 9,
2006).
230. See infra Part III.A.
231. See infra Part III.B; see also CAN-SPAM Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://commerce.
senate.gov/hearings/index.cfm?cong=108&sessn=l&subc=999 (follow "CAN-SPAM Act"
hyperlink) [hereinafter Senate CAN-SPAM Act Hearing] (statement of Sen. John McCain)
("In the long run ... I continue to believe that dynamic, market-based efforts have a far
better chance at defeating the ever-changing, global technological maneuvers of spammers
than anything we can write into our static laws.").
232. See Senate CAN-SPAM Act Hearing, supra note 231 (statement of Ted Leonsis,
Vice Chairman, America Online, Inc., and President, AOL Core Service) (testifying that
America Online's significant investment in spam technology is rooted in the partnership
that exists between the government and the ISP industry in fighting spam).
233. See infra Part III.C.
234. See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 372
(5th Cit. 2005) (declining to infer preemption because of "Congress's apparent failure to
contemplate" the scope of the CAN-SPAM exemption provision), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1039 (2006).
235. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that all jurists support looking
beyond statutory text to some degree or another as necessary to ascertain congressional
intent).
237. See infra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
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This intent is most evident within the text of the CAN-SPAM Act it-
self.138 Congress did not intend for all Internet providers, public and pri-
vate alike, to fall under the statutory term "provider of Internet access";
why else would Congress segregate ISPs from other Internet providers in
its findings section? 39 Additionally, Congress separated the ISP cause of
action from the federal and state enforcement provisions.' 4° Congress
also explicitly provided that the preemption provision extends not only to
the states, but also to all state subdivisions.4' Thus, under a fair reading
of the CAN-SPAM Act in its entirety, it is clear that Congress intended
to exclude state-level agencies and subdivisions from the scope of the ISP
242definition, and thus exclude them from the exemption provision.
The CAN-SPAM Act's legislative history provides further insight into
congressional intent.143 Congress viewed legitimate spam as a commer-
cially valid form of speech 244 and intended for the preemption provision
245to have a sweeping effect on state laws that curtailed legitimate spam.
Additionally, Congress intended for the exemption provision to be lim-
ited to private parties.246 Thus, the exemption provision is not an escape
238. See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. Negative inference is a widely
recognized tool of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. See supra note
182.
240. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text; see also John E. Brockhoeft,
Evaluating the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 4 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 1, 22-25 (2004) (breaking
down the CAN-SPAM Act's enforcement provisions into three sections: enforcement by
the FTC and other federal agencies, enforcement by states, and enforcement by ISPs).
241. See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (Supp. III 2003) ("This chapter supersedes any statute,
regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the
use of electronic mail to send commercial messages .... " (emphasis added)). This statu-
tory structure mirrors the pre-CAN-SPAM paradigm where private ISPs were allowed to
filter spam without government interference. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying
text.
242. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
244. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 2 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349
("[L]egitimate businesses ... wish to use commercial e-mail as another channel for mar-
keting products or services."); see also 149 CONG. REC. S15,946 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (arguing that legitimate commercial sparn must be protected
under the CAN-SPAM Act); 149 CONG. REC. S13,125 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003) (statement
of Sen. Feingold) ("I am pleased ... that the [CAN-SPAM Act] . . . allow[s] legitimate
commercial e-mail to continue to be sent.").
245. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 21, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2365 (explaining that the
CAN-SPAM preemption provision is designed to "creat[e] ... one national standard" of
spain regulation).
246. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. Other legal analysts support this in-
terpretation of CAN-SPAM ISPs as private entities. See Adam Hamel, Note, Will the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 Finally Put a Lid on Unsolicited E-mail?, 39 NEw ENG. L. REV.
961, 989 n.240 (2005) ("Critics of CAN-SPAM were disappointed that Congress limited
private-party standing to ISPs."); see also Sullivan & de Leeuw, supra note 16, at 903
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hatch for state-level Internet providers to filter legitimate spam outside of
the CAN-SPAM Act.247 Rather, it is a statutory recognition that private
ISPs, as private entities, should be allowed to decide what flows onto their
248
servers.
The Fifth Circuit's failure to correctly identify this congressional intent
is partially due to the fact that a public university regulation was at is-
sue.2 49 Public universities have traditionally provided e-mail services, and
prohibiting them from regulating spain would adversely affect the expec-
tations of users of university e-mail services.2'
A court that reviewed a public ISP spam prohibition, however, would
not face these concerns-striking down such a prohibition would not
change the status quo as private e-mail providers would continue to filter
spain under the CAN-SPAM Act exemption.2 1 Under an unbounded
statutory approach, the court would likely identify the clear congressional
intent: to preempt all governmental sparn regulations at the state level.
2 52
Any presumption against preemption, triggered by a public ISP's effec-
tuation of its police power to protect e-mail users,2 3 would be overcome
in light of this congressional intent.2
B. Preemption Aside, a Spain Prohibition, Although Constitutionally
Valid, Is an Imprudent Policy Choice
Notwithstanding the legality of a spam regulation, a public ISP should
avoid a spain prohibition on policy grounds.25 This seems counterintui-
tive; why not ban spain when the Fifth Circuit's commercial speech hold-
("[P]rivate parties, such as ISPs, have started bringing civil litigation based on the CAN-
SPAM Act .... ).
247. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (citing statements by ISP industry rep-
resentatives indicating that any federal spain law must include an exemption provision
confirming the right of private ISPs to filter all spare, legitimate and fraudulent alike).
249. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
250. Although the Fifth Circuit claimed that policy considerations did not "drive [its]
determination," it openly acknowledged that "[i]t would be an unusual policy to allow
private, but not public, educational institutions to act as custodians for the interests of its
online community." See White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d 366,373 n.13 (5th Cir. 2005).
251. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 238-48 and accompanying text; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1)
(Supp. III 2003) ("[The CAN-SPAM Act] supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a
State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to
send commercial messages." (emphasis added)).
253. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text. In the Internet age, protecting
users of a public ISP from the harmful effects of spam is a legitimate state police power.
See State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 411-12 (Wash. 2001); see also Ferguson v. Friendfinders,
Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1266-69 (2002).
254. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 56:609
2007] A Proposal for Cities and Municipalities to Regulate Spare 641
ing allows such a regulation? 6 The Fifth Circuit's commercial speech
analysis can reasonably be applied to municipal spam regulations.
Moreover, empirical evidence buttresses this analysis.5  First, research
indicates that a substantial state interest exists in outlawing spam because
of the significant burden it imposes on networks and e-mail users. 59 Sec-
ond, studies show that a reasonable means-ends connection exists be-
tween prohibiting spam and easing the burden of spare on networks and
260e-mail users.
256. See supra Part II.B.
257. A public ISP has the same state interest in prohibiting spam as a public university,
namely, to protect servers and e-mail users. See Moorefield, supra note 206, para. 41 (ar-
guing that a state has a substantial interest in banning spam to "ensur[e] the Internet's
continued viability" and protect e-mail recipients from the burden of spam). In fact, a
state would probably have a greater interest in banning spain than a university because of
the significant costs that spam imposes on businesses, see infra note 259, a concern clearly
not present for university servers.
258. See infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
259. As to the burden on servers, ISPs expend significant resources filtering spam to
protect their servers from crashing and to ensure user productivity. See Winning the War
on Spare, supra note 216 (estimating that spare costs American businesses three billion
dollars per year on technology and lost productivity); see also supra note 212 and accom-
panying text (noting that spam attacks can still slow a server). As to the burden on e-mail
users, studies show that spam is still a significant cost and annoyance. See supra note 213
and accompanying text.
260. In applying the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the Fifth Circuit was correct that
a clear means-ends fit exists between prohibiting spam and protecting e-mail users. Stud-
ies increasingly show that filters are the only effective means of controlling the flow of
spain to e-mail accounts. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. Additionally, other
policies that target spam are proving to be ineffective. The CAN-SPAM Act has done
little to impact spare flow. See. Cara Garretson, Settlements Prove that Spare Laws Have
Teeth, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 15,2005, at 12, 12 (pointing out that "[d]espite a few high-
profile settlements, CAN-SPAM and other laws are not having the desired effect on cur-
tailing unwanted e-mail"). Additionally, the CAN-SPAM opt-out scheme has produced
widely varying results as to its effectiveness. See Senate CAN-SPAM Act Hearing, supra
note 231 (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (noting
that in a 2002 study, the FTC found that 63% of opt-out links in spain messages did not
function properly). But see FED. TRADE COMM'N, TOP ETAILERS' COMPLIANCE WITH
CAN-SPAM'S OPT-OUT PROVISIONS: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION'S DIVISION OF MARKETING PRACTICES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/optout05/050801optoutetailersrpt.pdf (concluding that the top
hundred sparn retailers have "substantially complied with all of the CAN-SPAM Act's opt-
out provisions").
However, the court was incorrect that a state spam prohibition designed to protect
servers would fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. See White Buffalo Ven-
tures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 375-76 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 1039 (2006). The court applied the "least restrictive" test in arriving at its holding,
id. at 374-75, instead of the "narrowly tailored" test, the proper standard for conducting a
means-ends analysis. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Under this standard, any
alternative spam policy that allows legitimate spam to flow onto a network, even at off-
peak hours, could impact server efficiency. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
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However, three compelling policy considerations should dissuade pub-
lic ISPs from prohibiting spam.261  First, any citywide spam prohibition
would be impossible to enforce.262 For example, federal authorities al-
ready have trouble locating and prosecuting spammers;263 a local public
ISP with limited resources would have little to no chance of success. En-
forcement would also be difficult as to businesses and private e-mail pro-
viders. Filtering spain is already a difficult task; penalizing private enti-
ties for inadequate filtering would only drive them away from public
iSPs.
26 4
Second, any spam prohibition would likely engender hostility with e-
mail providers, the one group that is proving effective in subduing
spam.26 Private e-mail providers are equipped with the filtering technol-
ogy necessary to stop the majority of Spam, both fraudulent and legiti-
mate. 26 Evidence shows, however, that these providers white-list certain
legitimate spam, allowing it to reach user in-boxes.267 As such, to comply
with a spam prohibition, a private e-mail provider would have to change
its filters to stop all spain from flowing into user accounts, but only for
those users operating on the public ISP. Instead of imposing regulatory
hurdles on private e-mail providers, a public ISP's spam policy should
encourage private parties to continue developing more effective filtering
Even if this connection is somewhat attenuated, the risk of a server crashing justifies a
spam prohibition as a "reasonably tailored" measure.
261. See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
262. See Senate CAN-SPAM Act Hearing, supra note 231 (statement of Sen. John
McCain) (noting that only eight spam cases were filed under the CAN-SPAM Act in the
first five months of the Act's operation and concluding that government authorities alone
have little hope in stopping spammers).
263. See supra note 262.
264. See House Energy and Commerce Spain Hearings, supra note 104, at 43-44 (state-
ment of Ira Rubinstein, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corp.) (arguing that private
ISPs cannot be expected to stop all spain and would disfavor spam laws that penalize ISPs
for allowing spam through filters).
265. See supra note 260 (noting that the CAN-SPAM Act enforcement scheme and
opt-out schemes are proving ineffective in combating spam).
266. See supra note 216 and accompanying text; see also Crayton Harrison, The Battle
for Your Inbox, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 2005, at 1D (noting that businesses
and ISPs with advanced filtering technology are helping reduce the flow of spain into e-
mail accounts); POSTINI, ANTI-SPAM PRODUCT NOT WORKING? WHAT MORE
COMPANIES ARE SWITCHING TO ... AND WHY 2 (2005), available at http://www.postini.
com/whitepapers/ (noting that one of Postini's top products, the Postini Perimeter Man-
ager, stopped 97% of all span in one test). Some reports predict that filters will eventually
block all spam as algorithms get better and better. See Zeller, supra note 12.
267. See FTC SUBJECT LINE LABELING REPORT, supra note 154, at 11 (describing the
white-list process by which private ISPs allow legitimate e-mail to reach e-mail users).
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technology that will, in the end, decrease the amount of spam that
reaches user in-boxes.2'6
Finally, a public ISP's spam prohibition arguably creates a nexus of ac-
tivity between the state and private e-mail providers sufficient for a find-
ing of state action.269 This would create constitutional issues beyond com-
mercial speech, particularly equal protection concerns.270
C. Crafting ISP Regulations to Ensure that Private E-mail Providers Stay
Private- The Problem of State Action
As discussed above, a public ISP should adopt a hands-off approach to
avoid the state action issue.27' Public ISPs have already instituted regula-
tions for users of public networks relating to Internet use and liability. 72
They are also considering regulations that will apply to e-mail providers,
such as security measures limiting access to registered participants .173 The
268. See Zeller, supra note 12 (positing that private companies will continue refining
algorithms that stop spam, thereby decreasing, over time, the amount of spare reaching in-
boxes). Some industry experts are so optimistic that advanced filters will stop spain that
they predict spain will be completely eradicated in the near future. See The Economist:
War on Spam Can be Won via Technology and Courts (March 12, 2004),
http://www.ebusinessforum.com (follow "Thought Leadership" hyperlink; search for "War
on Spain Can be Won") (noting that Bill Gates predicted in early 2004 that spam would be
eliminated by 2006). Other experts are more hesitant and predict that spammers will al-
ways find a way to infiltrate even the best filters. See Harbaugh, supra note 13 (noting that
even the best filters still allow five percent of all spam to reach user e-mail accounts).
269. See infra Part III.C. A spam prohibition, as a commercial speech restriction, is the
same thing as the state commanding a private utility to bar certain forms of speech from
the public airwaves. See Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827
F.2d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding state action in a county attorney asking a telephone
company to prohibit adult entertainment calls on its phone lines).
270. ISP black-list and white-list policies are susceptible to equal protection challenges
because they selectively choose which e-mails enter ISP networks. See FTC SUBJECT LINE
LABELING REPORT, supra note 154, at 11 (describing the ISP white-list and black-list
process). Even more problematic on equal protection grounds is evidence that private
ISPs allow their own spam to reach their customers while blocking spari from other Inter-
net sources. See Senate CAN-SPAM Act Hearing, supra note 231 (testimony of Ronald
Scelson, Scelson Online Marketing).
271. See infra notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., BVU OptiNet, Privacy Policy, http://go.bvub.com/insideaboutus.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (noting that as part of Bristol Virginia Utilities' privacy policy,
subscriber information is required, and consumer name and address information may be
disclosed to third parties); Ashland Fiber Network, Acceptable Use Policy,
http://www.ashlandfiber.net/acceptable.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (noting that spam-
mers are prohibited from using the public Internet for Ashland, Oregon); Spanish Fork
Community Network, Website Policies and Disclaimer, http://www.sfcn.org/sfcn/
disclaimer.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (warning that there is "no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" using the public network and that all activities are subject to the city's
monitoring).
273. See, e.g., BVU OptiNet, supra note 272 (requiring all Internet users to register
with the city's Internet provider). For a general discussion of public ISPs seeking to im-
Catholic University Law Review
more a public ISP regulates, however, the closer it comes to triggering the
doctrine of state action.274 This would be disastrous for a public ISP. As-
suming that public ISPs are subject to the CAN-SPAM Act, e-mail pro-
viders acting as state actors would be prohibited under the CAN-SPAM
276Act from filtering any legitimate spain. This would result in an increase
of spam into user e-mail accounts, 27' and amplify the already difficult task
of distinguishing fraudulent spam from legitimate spam. 278
To trigger the state action doctrine, a public ISP would have to regulate
in such a way that a nexus of activity exists between the public ISP and e-
mail provider.279 Not surprisingly, the case law is bereft of Internet state
action analyses employing the nexus test.28 However, state action cases
involving utility companies demonstrate that regulations, by themselves,
are insufficient to support a finding of state action 1 The bar is high con-
cerning the amount of contacts necessary for a nexus to exist;22 even
grants of monopoly power and tariff restrictions have been rejected as
regulations sufficient for a nexus.2
Thus, a public ISP has significant room to maneuver in regulating its
network without exposing e-mail providers to treatment as a state ac-
prove network security, see Louis Aguilar & Deborah Sherman, Wi-Fi Users Vulnerable to
Hackers at DIA, Elsewhere, DENVER POST, May 14, 2004, at 1C (reporting on susceptibil-
ity of public Internet users to hackers seeking financial and personal identity information);
Larry Seltzer, Wireless Access: The Next Great Municipal Crisis, EWEEK, June 23, 2005,
http://www.eweek.comarticle2/0,1759,1830998,00.asp (noting that public ISPs seek to stop
spammers from hijacking their networks to proliferate spam).
274. See infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part III.A.
276. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (noting that state subdivisions under
the CAN-SPAM preemption clause are prohibited from filtering legitimate spam).
277. See FTC SUBJECr LINE LABELING REPORT, supra note 154, at 11 (noting that
although private ISPs employ white-list policies, most ISPs generally prohibit unsolicited
commercial e-mail).
278. See Symantec Corp., How Filtering Techniques Can Screen Out Spam (May 10,
2005), http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/article.cfm?articleid=5666&EID=0 (explain-
ing that fraudulent spammers increasingly avoid filters by hijacking URLs of legitimate
companies).
279. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). The "nexus" test is
the only relevant state action standard because the courts have already rejected the public
function standard as applied to private ISPs. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that private ISPs are not public
actors exercising a traditional state power).
280. See supra Part I.A.3. This comes as no surprise because federal and state govern-
ments have, more or less, adopted a "hands off' approach to the Internet. See supra note
101 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
282. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51 (holding that heavy regulations by the state are
not sufficient by themselves to constitute the nexus required for state action).
283. See supra note 91.
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tor.8 Still, adopting a hands-off policy from the beginning will serve as a
useful guidepost for future regulatory decisions and ensure that e-mail
providers will continue to filter spam without the problem of state ac-
tion.85
IV. CONCLUSION
On the surface, the Fifth Circuit's preemption and commercial speech
holdings in White Buffalo Ventures appear to be gold mines for a public
ISP seeking to prohibit spam on a public server. However, both holdings
are empty promises for a public ISP serious about constructing a viable
long-term spam policy. The preemption holding misinterprets Congress'
intent concerning the CAN-SPAM exemption and preemption provisions
as Congress intended for public entities to be preempted by the CAN-
SPAM Act. The commercial speech holding, although constitutionally
sound, leads to an unenforceable spam prohibition with the potential of
angering private e-mail providers-the most important ally in fighting
spam. Instead of following in the wake of White Buffalo Ventures, a pub-
lic ISP should chart its own course: stay out of spain regulation, encour-
age the private industry to continue advancements in the filtering tech-
nology, and create Internet regulations that avoid state action problems.
284. See supra notes 281-83.
285. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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